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The comparative analysis of intergenerational support patterns based on SHARE, the Survey 
of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe, with about 30.000 respondents from eleven 
European countries reveals a distinct geographical distribution of private support patterns: 
In Northern Europe help between parents and children is very common, but typically little 
time-consuming. The contrary is true for Southern Europe, where comparably few support 
relations  are  very  intense  in  terms  of  time.  Central  Western  Europe  lies  in-between  with 
average  transfer  rates  and  intensities.  Using  multilevel  modeling,  these  different  support 
patterns  can  be  explained  by  the  prevalence  of  public  assistance  according  to  the 
specialization hypothesis: With increased public transfers and social services, sporadic help 
is more likely (crowding in), and less time consuming support between generations (crowding 
out) occurs. Accordingly, most support is provided voluntarily in Northern Europe, whereas it 
is more often perceived as obligatory in Continental and Mediterranean countries.  
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WHY STUDY INTERGENERATIONAL HELP? 
Population ageing already is one of the foremost challenges for European societies today, and 
it will affect more and more countries in future. The balance between old and young is rapidly 
changing in all industrialized societies and ever less young people will have to care for ever 
more frail elderly, even if the rising number of healthy life years is taken into consideration 
(Lafortune  et  al.  2007).  Although  until  now  empirical  studies  have  not  accounted  for  a 
resulting decline of intergenerational solidarity in Western societies (e.g., Arber and Attias-
Donfut 2000; Bengtson 2001; Hank 2007; Silverstein et al. 1998), there is growing concern 
about the future (see e.g., Walker 1999). In recent times of economic crisis and welfare state 
retrenchment, the family might become ever more important as a personal ‘safety net’ while 
the private resources to support relatives financially and practically are declining. Different 
social systems have taken different paths to adjust to expected future developments (see e.g., 
Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Saraceno and Keck 2010). It is still unclear, however, how they 
will cope with upcoming challenges. It is thus vitally important to assess how exactly private 
and public support interact to maintain and mobilize societal resources efficiently. Particularly 
the analysis of interrelations between state, market, culture, and support between generations 
might thus provide clues to a successful ‘intergenerational policy’ in times of progressive 
population ageing. 
In order to assess transfers between generations in different societies one has to account 
for  the  whole  spectrum  of  transfers  between  parents  and  children.  Most  of  the  extensive 
sociological  literature  on  intergenerational  transfers  deals  with  assistance  to  the  elderly 
(Spitze  and  Logan  1992)  and  focuses  on  support  with  activities  of  daily  living  (ADL). 
Personal care is a very important and often intense form of support with great impact on giver 
and receiver. From a societal point of view however, it occurs rather seldom and only in 
cases, where a frail person needs extensive support. Practical help with instrumental activities 
of  daily  living  (IADL)  on  the  contrary  is  an  everyday  task  that  is  given,  received  and 3 
exchanged in and between all age and social groups, and has an immense productive function 
for society. From a theoretical point of view, help with IADL is a very flexible indicator for 
intergenerational support because it may range from one time support for children moving 
house to the daily preparation of meals for the older parent. Where ‘care’ in almost every case 
also  includes  ‘help’  tasks,  ‘help’  does  not  necessarily  include  ‘care’.  Both  support  forms 
depend  on  different  influencing  factors  and  have  to  be  understood  as  different  functional 
dimensions of intergenerational solidarity needing to be analyzed separately (Brandt et al. 
2009; Walker et al. 1995).  
The following analysis, based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) 2004, will therefore focus on practical help with household chores (housework, 
gardening, repairs, transport, paperwork) between respondents 50+ (G2), their adult children 
(18+, G3) and their elderly parents (64+, G1) in eleven European countries (Austria AU, 
Belgium BE, Denmark DK, France FR, Germany DE, Greece GR, Italy IT, the Netherlands 
NL, Spain ES, Sweden SE, and Switzerland CH). The paper goes beyond recent research by 
firstly differentiating between the occurrence and the intensity of practical help in different 
intergenerational directions. It investigates, how likely practical help from the middle aged 
respondents to their elderly parents and to their adult children is, and analyses the intensity of 
this support in terms of time. Secondly, different help patterns in Europe are directly traced 
back to distinct features of welfare state and market by employing multilevel models. To 
separate such context effects it is vitally important to account for country compositions in 
terms of individual  and familial factors  which  might impact on intergenerational support. 
These  influences  will  be  addressed  in  the  following  section  before  contextual  factors  are 
focused upon in more detail.  
 4 
INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND PRACTICAL SUPPORT 
Intergenerational solidarity is a latent construct (van Gaalen and Dykstra 2006) composed of 
various dimensions expressing a mutual feeling of togetherness. The original model including 
six  dimensions  by  Bengtson  and  colleagues  (e.g.,  Bengtson  and  Roberts  1991)  has  been 
modified by Szydlik (2004), who identified structural, normative and consensual solidarity as 
influencing  factors,  separating  them  from  outcomes  like  functional,  associational  and 
affectual  solidarity.  Transfers  of  time,  such  as  practical  help,  form  part  of  the  functional 
dimension and are a crucial outcome of intergenerational solidarity. 
Various factors are known to influence intergenerational transfers: On the micro level the 
interplay of resources of the related individuals (opportunities and needs) determine giving 
and receiving. People who need support are more likely to receive help, and those who have 
more resources to give support tend to do so more likely (Szydlik 2008). Intergenerational 
relations  are  embedded  in  family  structures  (meso  level)  impacting  on  transfer  patterns. 
Support to frail parents, for example, is often shared between siblings – leading to each single 
sibling helping less often, but with specific gender differences: Women tend to take over 
personal care, whereas men take over practical help such as repairs, shopping, support with 
financial and legal matters etc. (e.g., Finch and Mason 1990; Martin-Matthews and Campbell 
1995). The influences of individual and family features on intergenerational support have 
already been analyzed in great detail in various cultural and political settings (e.g., Attias-
Donfut 2003; Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008; Silverstein and Bengtson 1997; Szydlik 2008). 
These cross sectional single country studies do however not allow for conclusions about the 
influences  of  different  societal  contexts.  Contextual  structures,  namely  “conditions  of  the 
social, economic and tax system […], the welfare state, and the labour and housing market, as 
well as the specific rules and norms of certain institutions and groups” (Szydlik 2008: 100), 
have an impact on family structures on the one hand and on individual resources of parents 
and  children  on  the  other.  Accordingly,  they  also  influence  intergenerational  transfers. 5 
Persons with sufficient financial resources are for example able to buy services for themselves 
but  also  for  other  family  members  in  need  of  assistance  –  if  comprehensive  professional 
services are available. The utilization of external help may result in more time for collective 
family activities that are not centered to needs (Künemund and Rein 1999). Thus, welfare 
provision and the services available might not only influence the kind of support exchanged in 
a  social  network,  but  also  individual  support  motives.  Cultural  norms,  welfare  state 
characteristics,  and  private  support  patterns  are  interrelated  (see  e.g.,  Triandis  1994;  van 
Oorschot et al. 2008). 
Recent comparative research with SHARE data accordingly reveals distinct differences 
concerning functional intergenerational support patterns in different European countries and 
welfare regimes (e.g., Albertini et al. 2007; Bonsang 2007; Ogg and Renaut 2006), but does 
not  assess  possible  explanations  empirically.  If  one  wants  to  test  the  influences  of  state, 
market,  and  culture,  the  interplay  between  all  decisive  factors  addressed  above  must  be 
accounted  for  in  order  to  isolate  explanatory  contributions  of  specific  features.  Thus, 
influences known from previous research such as resources of the givers and receivers (e.g., 
health, education, income, age) as well as family structures (e.g., number of children, siblings, 
grandchildren, and stepchildren) are controlled for in the following analyses of contextual 
impacts on help between generations. 
 
SPECIALIZATION BETWEEN FAMILY AND STATE 
Even if social systems in Europe are slowly converging, cultural and historical differences 
still have a significant impact on current welfare and family regimes (e.g., Daatland 2001; 
Daatland and Herlofson 2003a; Reher 1998; Wolf and Ballal 2006). How these differences 
affect individuals, families and transfers between generations is a very important question, 
especially in times of population ageing. Aside the popular discussion about “crowding out” 
and “crowding in” (the substitution or consolidation of private transfers by state interventions; 6 
e.g.,  Kohli  1999;  Künemund  and  Rein  1999),  recently  a  third  theoretical  perspective  has 
evolved, that might be suited to consolidate these two – reputedly – competing hypotheses: 
Public support in the form of state transfers as well as social services and family support are 
complementing each other. If this division of labor is related to specific tasks, one could also 
speak  of  a  “mixed  responsibility”,  a  “functional  differentiation”  or  a  “specialization”  of 
different supportive instances (e.g., Daatland and Herlofson 2003b; Litwak 1985; Litwak et 
al. 2003; Motel-Klingebiel et al. 2005). Organizations, such as for example social service 
providers, are more prone to fulfill technically, legally or medically demanding and regularly 
scheduled support tasks whereas private helpers know the individual needs and wishes of 
their relative and are also more likely to give spontaneous support (see Litwak 1985; Litwak 
et al. 2003). 
For example, if public service providers take over regular personal care, family members 
do  not  only  often  assist  in  organizing  this  care  arrangement  but  are  also  more  prone  to 
emotionally and instrumentally support their relatives in need on a sporadic basis – a result 
found across nations (e.g., Bazo and Ancizu 2004) and assessing long term developments 
(e.g., Lingsom 1997). Different instances fulfill specific tasks appropriate to their resources 
and  competences  –  an  arrangement  that  possibly  not  only  leads  to  a  higher  quantity  and 
quality of support, but also to more personal autonomy for the receivers as well as a relief for 
the (often female) private caregivers (Daatland 1990; Neal et al. 1997).  
Following the specialization hypothesis (Brandt et al. 2009; Deindl and Brandt 2010; Igel 
et al. 2009) one can presume that sporadic help between parents and children is prevalent in 
states with generous welfare systems. Social service providers can be entrusted with regular 
and demanding support if families and people in need have the means to access them. Family 
members are then enabled to give additional support to their relatives if, when and in which 
form they like to.  7 
In  countries  where  little  state  transfers  and  market  services  are  offered  and  the 
responsibilities for the needy are family centered, support is presumably less likely, but a lot 
more time consuming when given. When a family member is in need of support and public 
services are barely available, relatives are forced to support the dependent person, even if this 
competes with their own plans and wishes. Additionally, carers have less time for helping 
others when supporting one person intensively (Brandt et al. 2009). In less generous welfare 
states, sporadic private help might therefore be crowded out by the intensive support tasks for 
relatives in need. 
It is thus hypothesized that (a) the more public support is available in a country, the more 
likely is sporadic practical help between adult generations, (b) the less public assistance is 
provided, the more intensive is support between parents and children, and (c) the more public 
support is available, the more often intergenerational help is a complementing, voluntary task. 
According to this specialization hypothesis it is thus not necessarily the overall help volume 
that is affected by social policies (and vice versa), it is rather the patterns of intergenerational 
help that are expected to vary across different welfare regimes.  
 
DATA AND METHOD 
To examine contextual influences on support patterns between parents and their children in 
Europe, we use the SHARE data collected in 2004, a representative database about the lives 
and living conditions of about 30,000 Europeans aged 50 and over in private households 
(www.share-project.org, for methodological details see Börsch-Supan & Jürges, 2005).
1 The 
question about practical support given reads: 
”Now I would like to ask you about the help you have given to others. In the last twelve 
months, have you personally given any kind of help listed on card 28 to a family member from 
outside the household, a friend or neighbor?”.  
                                                           
1 The sample characteristics are included in Tables A1, A2, and A3. 8 
Forms of help mentioned on card 28 include practical household help, such as help with home 
repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, household chores and help with paperwork, such 
as filling out forms and settling financial or legal matters. Each respondent could name up to 
three different receivers of these forms of support. The intensity of the practical support given 
is measured as average time spent helping the respective person per week.  
To control for resources of the individuals as well as family structures, we use information 
the respondents provided about themselves and their natural parents. In the following analyses 
we include persons aged 50 and above (G2) and the relations to their elderly parents (G1) as 
well as their adult children (G3) outside the household.
2  
To assess intergenerational help we construct specific parent-child-dyads. These relations 
are not only theoretically, but also empirically nested in individuals (see also Klein Ikkink et 
al. 1999), families (household level), and contexts (country level). Logistic and linear four 
level models are used to assess the impact of micro, meso, and macro level structures on the 
likelihood and intensity of intergenerational help (for details on multilevel modeling see Hox 
2002; Snijders and Bosker 2004). Random intercept models were estimated using the Stata 
procedures  xtmixed  and  xtlogit  (see  Rabe-Hesketh  and  Skrondal  2008).  Logistic  models 
(help: yes/no) account for all parent-child-dyads, linear models (log (hours)) apply solely to 
helpers. In both cases unstandardized coefficients indicate positive effects if greater than zero, 
and  negative  effects  if  lower  than  zero.  Z  values  allow  the  assessment  of  the  exact 
significance level as well as the relative importance of a specific indicator within the model 
(rank order). Separate models were estimated for each single macro indicator (see next section 
for details) due to the low number of countries available. The Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) assessing the overall model fit (the deviance corrected for the number of first level 
observations and estimated parameters) is used to compare separate models, with lower BIC 
values  indicating  better  fit.  Finally,  individual  help  motivations  such  as  obligation  and 
                                                           
2 The focus is not the “sandwich” or “pivot” position of the respondents (see e.g., Grundy & Henretta, 2006), but 
intergenerational relations between different cohorts in Europe.  9 
enjoyment retrieved from the additional SHARE paper questionnaire serve as indicators for a 
tendency
3 to complementing voluntary versus necessary obligatory help at national level. 
 
SUPPORT REGIMES IN EUROPE? 
According to the specialization thesis, any kind of public support that leaves the family more 
resources and freedom to decide on the kind of assistance they provide, may influence if and 
how family members engage in intergenerational support. It is thus not only public support 
with IADL, but also financial assistance and personal care by public providers that needs to 
be addressed in order to measure possible contextual influences on family help. In order to 
measure public support  complementing intergenerational help as analyzed here,  all public 
sources of support for families and people in need of assistance with instrumental and non 
instrumental activities of daily living are therefore taken into account: Public assistance such 
as (a) social expenditure directed to all deprived citizens, (b) family expenditure directed to 
younger families, and (c) health and social service supply directed to people in need of such 
assistance serve as measures of the public support level provided to citizens in all age groups.  
 
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
The proportion of family expenditure in a countries’ total spending (d) additionally serves as 
indicator of how important the family is from a political perspective, and how responsibilities 
for family members in need are divided between private and public (see Table A3 for the 
detailed numbers). Figure 1 shows the relative positions of the SHARE countries according to 
the  four  macro-indicators  retrieved  from  OECD  databases  (2007a,  b,  c),  forming  four 
distinctive  groups:  Southern  Europe  with  comparably  low  social  and  family  assistance, 
                                                           
3 The results are interpreted with caution as the paper questionnaire reached substantially lower response rates 
than the main CAPI survey. 10 
continental  Europe  with  medium  social  expenditure  and  service  supply,  but  comparably 
extensive  efforts  for  families  in  France  and  Belgium,  the  “pioneers  of  family  policy” 
(Pfenning and Bahle 2000: 2) as well as Austria. In the socio-democratic regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990) Denmark and Sweden, the state assumes comprehensive responsibility for all 
citizens in need of assistance. These Scandinavian countries offer the most comprehensive 
public support for families and people in need. According to the specialization hypothesis, 
these regions should thus form different ‘support regimes’. We will now test this hypothesis 
by analyzing patterns of practical help between children to parents, using exactly the variation 
in culture and welfare policies in the European ‘natural laboratory’.  
 
HELP TO OLDER PARENTS IN EUROPE 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Family and social policies follow a North-South gradient with high expenditure and services 
in the North, medium public spending and service provision in Central Western Europe and 
low public transfers in the South. A similar North-South distribution accounts for the number 
of respondents (G2) who help their parents (G1): The likelihood of upwards intergenerational 
help  in  Europe  ranges  from  37  percent  of  all  respondent-parent-dyads  in  Denmark  to  13 
percent in Spain (Figure 2, a). At first glance this seems surprising, especially if the existence 
of strong family ties in Southern Europe (Reher 1998) is taken for granted. When intensities 
are assessed, the contradiction resolves at least partly: Helping is around three to four times 
more intense in the South than in the North considering average weekly hours when only 
support relations are accounted for (Figure 2, b).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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According to bivariate analyses (Figure 3), help to older parents positively correlates with 
contextual  structures  such  as  expenditure,  the  relevance  of  the  family  and  social  service 
supply in Europe. The more public transfers and services, the more help relations with parents 
exist in a country. Before and after controlling for decisive factors on the dyadic, personal and 
household level (see Table 1 for covariates)
4, social services exhibit the strongest statistically 
significant correlation with the likelihood of help to parents in a country (r = 0.9).  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Following our hypotheses, helpers should also react to welfare state characteristics in terms of 
time  they  devote  to  help  their  parents.  Figure  4  shows  the  correlations  between  the  four 
indicators and the average amounts of support in help relations per week. The results are 
reinforcing to the crowding out thesis: The more transfers and services the state and market 
offer, the less weekly hours of help are given to parents. In Southern Europe (Greece and 
Italy) help hours range from about seven to nine hours weekly, in Central Western European 
countries it is less with around four hours in most cases, and in Northern Europe (Denmark, 
Sweden) as well as Switzerland helpers on average only spend between two and three hours a 
week assisting their parent. 
Table 1 and 2 include the multivariate logistic and linear multilevel model accounting for 
factors on four levels (dyad, person, household, and country) impacting the likelihood and 
intensity of help from respondents 50+ to their older parent. Influencing structures on micro 
(needs and opportunities of giver and receiver), meso (family structures), and macro level 
(country context) are thus analyzed jointly, allowing the assessment of their net impact on 
intergenerational help. As it is not possible to include more than one context variable on the 
                                                           
4 To receive the ‘net correlations’ in squared brackets, single country models including mean centered variables 
have been estimated to assess the baseline help levels in each country. 12 
basis of eleven country observations, a separate four level model including all controls was 
estimated for each macro indicator. The effects of the micro and meso level indicators do not 
vary substantively between these models, thus the coefficients from a model without macro 
variable but controlling for the country level variation are shown in Table 1.
5 
The model indicates that needs and opportunities of the potential givers have important 
consequences for help. The better the health condition and the more socio-economic resources 
the respondents have, the more likely they support their parent. Time consuming help on the 
other hand seems to correlate with a bad health condition of the giver. Interpreted as reverse 
causality, this points to a high pressure situation for the giver when intense help is necessary 
(see  also  Arrondel  and  Mason  2001)  –  an  interpretation  supported  by  many  care  studies 
showing that time consuming support places an intense burden on the givers and reduces their 
physical as well as mental health significantly (for an overview see e.g., Matthews 1988). 
Finally,  help  to  parents  also  encompasses  more  hours  on  average  when  children  are  not 
working and have lower financial resources. 
Furthermore, the parents’ resources play an important role: Help seems to be rewarded or 
stimulated  by  money  and  gifts  parents  transmitted  and  will  possibly  transmit  to  their 
offspring. But even more important is that children react to the needs of their parents. The 
older and the worse the health condition, the more likely is time consuming help provided by 
the child, especially if there is no partner in the parents’ household.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
All these influences are embedded in family structures which also have an impact on if and 
how  intensely  help  is  given.  The  smaller  the  geographical  distance,  the  more  likely 
respondents support their parents. It is mostly the respondents living closer who take over the 
                                                           
5 The complete analyses can be retrieved from the author by request.  13 
support responsibilities, but it might also be the case that some move closer to their parents 
when those become frail and need help. Most help is given from daughters to mothers, and 
this support is also the most time consuming. In all other relations help is less likely and less 
intense. Furthermore, having children (G3) plays a competing role with regard to help to the 
older parent (G1). As supposed, instrumental support seems to be divided between siblings 
(G2): The more siblings exist, the less likely it is that each single child helps. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
According to four separate models that control for all these factors (see Table 2), social and 
family  expenditure  as  well  as  social  services  have  significant  positive  effects  on 
intergenerational help to parents. The more public services are provided, the more children 
50+ give help to their older mother or father. This help is however less time consuming when 
state and market provide comprehensive support. As already indicated in Figure 1 and 2, 
social service supply is the best predictor of help. The results suggest a specific division of 
labor  or  specialization  between  service  providers  and  respondents.  The  family  takes  over 
sporadic support while public providers are in charge of intense regular
6 support to elders in 
need – if possible.  
 
HELP TO ADULT CHILDREN IN EUROPE 
Help to children ranges from two percent of the parent-child-dyads in Spain to around ten 
percent in Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden (Figure 5, a). The support intensity in terms of 
time again shows an opposite distribution with around 3 hours in the North of Europe to over 
ten hours weekly in Mediterranean Europe (Figure 5, b). 
 
                                                           
6 The same results emerge if the average help intensity in a country is measured as the fraction of daily help. 14 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
The analysis of downward help from G2 to G3 reinforces the previous findings: According to 
the crowding in hypothesis, respondents seem not only more prone to give practical help to 
their senior parents (G1) but also to their offspring (G3) if the provision of support by the 
state and at the market is higher (Figure 6). Again, service supply – the closest measureable 
public supplement for private help – is the best predictor before and after control of the other 
decisive factors. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
On the contrary,  and in line with the results concerning help to parents, the more public 
support in terms of social and family expenditure and social service supply, the less intense is 
help to children in terms of weekly hours according to Figure 7. After controlling for the 
country  composition  (individual  resources  and  family  structures,  see  Table  2)  the  highest 
correlation appears between help to children and family expenditure. As the latter is primarily 
directed to younger persons, this is not a surprising result; the more public transfers adult 
children (G3) receive in building their own household and family, the less they need intense 
support with IADL from their parents (G2). 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
According to the multilevel models in Table 3, help by respondents (G2) to their children 
(G3) follows similar mechanisms as upwards help to older parents (G1). Personal resources 
and  family  structures  again  account  for  help  variation  between  dyads,  individuals  and 
families. The further away the children live and the less healthy the responding parent is, the 15 
less likely he or she gives help to each single child. Parents with problems to make ends meet 
and  those  who  are  still  working  tend  to  help  less  likely,  and  in  the  latter  case  also  less 
intensely. 
Children who are able to support their parents financially and/or practically often receive 
help in return. According to the age effects, parents help their children most likely when the 
latter start their own career  and family. Help occurs very likely in  younger  years, and is 
rapidly decreasing with the age of the adult child. But still, in phases of unemployment and 
partnership  break-up,  parents  are  there  to  help  their  offspring  in  need.  Again,  the  living 
distance is one of the most important factors to predict intergenerational help and its intensity.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Gender effects are somewhat less evident than in the analysis of help to parents: Fathers seem 
to  be  as  likely  to  help  their  children  as  mothers  to  support  their  daughters.  The  average 
weekly  support  intensity  however  is  highest  in  female  dyads.  The  more  children  (G3) 
respondents  have  the  less  likely  and  intensely  they  tend  to  help  each  single  child.  More 
grandchildren  (G4)  on  the  other  hand  lead  to  more  help  with  household  chores  and 
administrative  issues  directed  to  the  young  families.  Stepchildren  are  less  likely  to  get 
instrumental support but if they do, it is just as intense. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Once more, controlling for micro and meso level factors, the contextual embeddedness of 
intergenerational help seems to play a significant role (Table 4): The more public transfers 
and services, the more likely are respondents to help their children, but the fewer hours this 
help encompasses. The results concerning intergenerational help to children thus also support 16 
the specialization hypothesis. Respondents seem to take over sporadic help to their offspring, 
and  to  leave  more  intense  forms  of  support  to  public  providers  if  social  and  family 
expenditure as well as the social service market allow them to do so. 
 
SUPPORT MOTIVES IN EUROPE 
According to our hypotheses, sporadic support is more likely in countries where the state 
takes over intense and time consuming support tasks. Following the logic of complementarity 
and specialization, private support should also be exchanged on a voluntary basis more often 
in  these  welfare  states.  To  the  contrary,  in  countries  where  citizens  in  need  receive  less 
support by the state, family members essentially must engage in support, when their relative 
needs help – which is then more likely perceived as obligatory and inevitable task.  
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
Analyzing support motives of the respondents 50+ (G2), we again find distinctive North-
South differences. Feelings of obligation are mainly driving transfers in Southern and Central 
Europe and joy is the most frequent motive named in the North – especially if the occurrence 
of both motives is compared. In Denmark for example less than five percent of respondents 
feel obligated to help, but around 45 percent say they help because they enjoy it. In Spain the 
relation almost reverses with 45 percent of obligation and around 20 percent of enjoyment 
(Figure 8).
7  
Overall, more people in the Northern countries enjoy helping than in the conservative 
welfare states and in familialistic Mediterranean Europe. This may at least partly be due to 
support alternatives in generous welfare systems where the family is not solely or mainly 
                                                           
7  As respondents were able to indicate both motives simultaneously, the different balances should not (only) be 
due to different cultural norms and answering behaviors. 17 
responsible for help to relatives in need. Figure 9 consequently shows how joyful helping 
correlates with public support at country level. The more public transfers and services, the 
more helpers enjoy their engagement – help seems to be not only more likely and less time 
consuming, but also more voluntary in countries with a comprehensive social service system. 
The more support family members get from the public social system, the more likely they 
take over sporadic help and the more often they seem to do it because they enjoy it. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
DISCUSSION 
In Western Europe, intergenerational help patterns between parents and children are related to 
public policies and social services even when individual and family characteristics are taken 
into  account  as  important  influencing  factors.  The  analyses  confirm  previous  research  on 
family solidarity and intergenerational transfers (see e.g., Szydlik 2008): The more resources 
the givers have and the higher the needs (lack of resources) of the potential receivers are, the 
more likely intense help is transferred. Time consuming help to older parents is related to bad 
health  of  the  givers,  and  thus  pointing  to  high  pressure  situations  when  parents  become 
dependent  on  intense  support  from  their  children  with  little  public  alternatives  existing. 
Similar  results  have  been  found  in  many  studies  on  personal  care,  which  places  a  heavy 
burden on the giver (Matthews 1988). 
On the family level we observe that the more potential receivers there are, the less likely is 
each single person to receive help. The more potential givers there are the more likely help is 
divided between these. On European average, women help most, but with specific differences 
between  help  directions  and  cohorts.  Male  respondents  do  not  engage  in  support  to  their 
parents very much, but support their children as likely as the mothers. This might be due to 
the  differences  between  help  tasks  for  older  and  younger  persons  (e.g.,  housework  vs. 18 
repairs), but also point to an ongoing change of gender roles, with fathers engaged in private 
help more than before. But nowadays, family obligations are still not equally shared between 
women  and  men.  The  burdens  of  intense  time  consuming  support  still  primarily  affect 
daughters, who are also concerned most with competing family obligations and increasingly 
involved in the labor market. If and how the state is able to influence gender roles in the 
family is not easily answered. Results suggest that comprehensive public support stimulates 
male help because men are more likely to give supplementary help if it does not conflict with 
their own life agenda (Brandt 2009).  
Inequalities can not only be found on the individual and family level but also between 
countries and social systems. Put neutrally, different ‘support regimes’ emerge in Western 
Europe: The likelihood of intergenerational help is highest in Northern Europe and gradually 
decreasing to the Mediterranean. On the other hand help is little time consuming in Sweden 
and Denmark with two to three hours on average per week increasing to around-the-clock 
support in Spain, Greece, and Italy. Similar results emerged in various studies concerning 
different solidarity indicators (e.g., Albertini et al. 2007; Hank 2007; Ogg and Renaut 2006) 
but these different patterns have never before been directly  traced back to the contextual 
factors driving them. 
The  empirical  analyses  of  contextual  influences  on  help  show,  that  the  more  public 
support the family receives the more likely sporadic help is transferred between children and 
parents. The public sector takes over more predictable, regular and medically or technically 
demanding support tasks while family members with personal knowledge about their relative 
rather provide supplemental practical support. This specific division of labor should have 
advantages for both giver and receiver. The quantity and the quality of support most likely 
increases, because everybody takes over the tasks they are best suited for, people in need are 
not  depending  solely  on  their  family,  and  relatives  are  discharged  from  obligatory 
burdensome support.  19 
It should not be dismissed that this does not only apply for help to older people. The 
respondents 50+ are also an important source of support for their children – predominantly in 
the  early  years  of  their  adult  life,  but  also  in  periods  of  special  need  (e.g.,  divorce, 
unemployment).  It  can  thus  be  deduced  that  ‘active  aging’,  at  least  in  terms  of  giving 
intergenerational help, is encouraged by generous social systems. 
Over and above, advantages of a specialization between family and state become apparent 
when  analyzing  help  motives.  Whilst  obligation  is  one  of  the  main  support  motives  in 
Southern Europe, enjoying help is comparably more common in Scandinavia. These ‘support 
cultures’  correlate  with  welfare  systems:  The  more  public  service  provision,  the  more 
voluntary support in a country – a fact that might not only positively affect helpers but also 
receivers. 
Even if going beyond recent comparative research, this study unfortunately suffers from 
limitations.  As  SHARE  data  until  now  only  provide  a  snapshot  of  the  lives  of  ageing 
Europeans,  disentangling  causalities  will  only  be  possible  when  more  waves  of  SHARE 
become available. Additionally, only respondent information can be employed to measure 
support between parents and children, a feature that might influence the results substantively 
(Lin 2008).  
Still,  it  is  quite  clear:  The  collaboration  between  family  and  state  leads  to  both  more 
comprehensive  and  manageable  private  support  in  a  country.  In  the  course  of  population 
aging the quantity and quality of support to a growing number of people in need of help and a 
decreasing number of potential givers can be assured by a generous public service supply. 
Simultaneously, resources of the elderly are strengthened, leading to longer autonomous lives 
and  more  possibilities  to  support  successor  generations.  Based  on  these  results  it  is  not 
advisable to overburden children and parents as the main private support source. Generous 
comprehensive public services and transfers seem to put family and societal life on a footing 20 
of voluntary solidarity and facilitate the reconciliation of individual and familial resources in 
an ageing Europe. 
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Note:  Data  retrieved  from  the  OECD  (2007a,  b,  c),  own  calculations.  Social  expenditure  measured  as 
expenditure for services, transfers and goods in 100 US-Dollar per capita 2002; Service supply measured as 
percentage of employees in sector N of the International Standard Industrial Classification; Family expenditure 
measured as expenditure for services, transfers and goods in 1000 US-Dollar per capita 2002; Proportion of 
family expenditure measured in percent of a countries’ total spending. See Table A3 for numbers. 27 
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Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, (a) weighted percentages, n =7825 respondent-parent-dyads / 
(b) average weekly hours, n = 1250 respondent-parent-dyads. 28 
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Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, weighted / OECD (2007a, b, c). n = 11 countries.  
Correlation r: **p < .01, *p < .05 [controlling for covariates indicated in Table 1]. 
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Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, weighted / OECD (2007a, b, c). n = 11 countries. 
Correlation r: *p < .05, †p < 0.10 [controlling for covariates indicated in Table 1].
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(a) Occurrence  (b) Intensity 
 
Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, (a) weighted percentages, n = 40,073 respondent-child-dyads / 
(b) average weekly hours, n = 2,584 respondent-child-dyads. 
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Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, weighted / OECD (2007a, b, c). n = 11 countries. 
Correlation r: **p < .01, *p < .05 [controlling for covariates indicated in Table 3]. 
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Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, weighted / OECD (2007a, b, c). n = 11 countries. 
Correlation r: **p < 0.01, *p < .05, †p < 0.10 [controlling for covariates indicated in Table 3]. 
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Figure 8: Support motives in Europe 
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Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, weighted / OECD (2007a, b, c). n = 11 countries. 
Correlation r: **p < 0.01. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Help to parents: Individual and family influences  
    Likelihood of help   Log(hours) of help  
    ß
a  z  ß
a  z 
Resources  Health (1 - 5)
b  0.15*  2.46  -0.17**  -3.49 
responding   Education low       
child (G2)     medium  0.30**  2.64  -0.03  -0.30 
      high  0.43**  3.42  -0.02  -0.23 
  Household makes ends meet 
fairly / easily 
0.27*  2.43  -0.22*  -2.38 
  Part / full time employed  0.11  1.11  -0.37**  -4.46 
Resources  Money to child  0.80**  3.83  -0.11  -0.76 
parent (G1)  Gift to child  0.27**  2.57  -0.08  -1.05 
  Chance of bequest < 50%       
     > = 50%  0.64**  6.31  -0.07  -0.92 
      unknown  -0.18  -0.58  -0.05  -0.16 
  Age (64 - 104)  0.03**  4.07   0.03**   4.03 
  Illness (1 - 5)
c  0.23**  5.40   0.12**  3.50 
  Partner  -0.69**  -6.14  -0.14  -1.60 
Family   Living distance (0 - 7)
d  -0.53**  -13.34  -0.18**  -7.00 
structures  Daughter-mother       
     son-mother   -0.76**  -7.25  -0.37**  -4.74 
     daughter-father  -1.10**  -7.82  -0.16  -1.56 
     son-father  -1.40**  -8.75  -0.58**  -4.84 
  Number of children (G3)  -0.10*  -2.56  -0.04  -1.36 
  Number of siblings (G2)  -0.13**  -5.03  -0.04†  -1.81 
Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, unweighted. n (likelihood) = 11 countries, 5,595 households, 
6,350 respondents, 7,825 dyads; n (hours) = 11 countries, 1,367 households, 1,437 persons, 1,520 dyads.  
a Unstandardized coefficients retrieved from four-level-model without context variable. 
b 1 = very poor health, 5 
= very good health. 
c 1 = very good health, 5 = very poor health..
d 0 = same house , 7 = more than 500 
kilometres & abroad. The linearity of effects was proofed by non-parametric estimation before implementing a 
(quasi-) metric variable. 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.  36 
Table 2: Help to parents: Contextual influences  
    Likelihood of help   Log(hours) of help  
    ß
a  z  ß
a  z 
Context (four separate full models) 
  Social expenditure
b  0.14**  7.78  -0.10  -1.58 
  BIC  7,874.1  5,350.2 
  Social services
c  0.35**  3.07  -0.05**  -2.86 
  BIC  7,856.7  5,346.5 
  Family expenditure
d  0.17**  3.51  -0.05†  -1.86 
  BIC  7,872.6  5,349.5 
  Family per state expenditure
e   0.31**  3.24  -0.10†  -1.85 
  BIC  7,873.5  5,349.5 
Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculations, unweighted / OECD (2007a, b, c). n (likelihood) = 11 countries, 
5,595 households, 6,350 respondents, 7,825 dyads; n (hours) = 11 countries, 1,367 households, 1,437 persons, 
1,520 dyads.  
a Unstandardized coefficients retrieved from separate four-level-models controlling for all individual and family 
characteristics (see Table 1). 
b Expenditure for services, transfers and goods in 100 US-Dollar per capita 2002. 
c 
Percentage of employees in sector N of the International Standard Industrial Classification. 
d Expenditure for 
services, transfers and goods in 1000 US-Dollar per capita 2002. 
e Percentage of countries’ total spending. 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.  37 
Table 3: Help to children: Individual and family influences  
    Likelihood of help  Log(hours) of help   
    ß
a  z  ß
a  z 
Resources  Health (1 - 5)
b  0.29**  7.56  0.04  0.78 
responding   Education low       
parent (G2)     medium  0.13  1.61  0.04  0.43 
      high  0.11  1.19  -0.11  -1.15 
  Household makes ends meet 
fairly / easily 
0.30**  3.43  -0.04  -0.45 
  Part / full time employed  -0.17*  -2.14  -0.38**  -4.17 
Resources  Help to parent  1.08**  10.76  -0.02  -0.15 
child (G3)  Money to parent  0.47†  1.75  -0.06  -0.19 
  Age (18 - 76)  -0.09**  -16.55  -0.01  -0.82 
  Age
2  -0.00**  -8.59  -0.00*  -1.96 
  Unemployable  0.73**  5.07  0.37*  2.29 
  Separated from partner  0.68**  5.67  0.19  1.45 
Family   Living distance (0 - 7)
c  -0.29**  -13.96  -0.15**  -5.99 
structures  Mother-daughter       
     mother-son   -0.71**  -9.16  -0.31**  -3.45 
     father-daughter  0.10  1.36  -0.41**  -4.98 
     father-son  -0.03  -0.43  -0.41**  -4.58 
  Number of children (G3)  -0.33**  -10.70  -0.15**  -4.40 
  Number of grandchildren (G4)  0.26**  9.06  0.14**  4.30 
  Stepchild  -0.80**  -4.85  -0.05  -0.25 
Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculation, unweighted. n (likelihood) = 11 countries, 13,438 households, 
19,148 respondents, 40,073 dyads; n (hours) = 11 countries, 1,752 households, 2,030 persons, 2,584 dyads.  
a Unstandardized coefficients retrieved from four-level-model without context variable. 
b 1 = very poor health, 5 
= very good health. 
c 0 = same house , 7 = more than 500 kilometres & abroad. The linearity of effects was 
proofed by non-parametric estimation before implementing a (quasi-) metric variable. 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.  38 
Table 4: Help to children: Contextual influences 
    Likelihood of help  Log(hours) of help   
    ß
a  z  ß
a  z 
Context (four separate full models) 
  Social expenditure
b  0.48**  12.06  -0.24**  -2.75 
  BIC  17,316.3  9,980.2 
  Social services
c  0.15**  13.64  -0.08**  -3.81 
  BIC  17,278.4  9,976.5 
  Family expenditure
d  0.22**  12.75  -0.13**  -4.28 
  BIC  17,302.0  9,974.7 
  Family per state expenditure
e  0.41**  12.23  -0.25**  -4.39 
  BIC  17,315.1  9,974.0 
Note: SHARE 2004 release 2, own calculation, unweighted / OECD (2007a; b; c). n (likelihood) = 11 countries, 
13,438 households, 19,148 respondents, 40,073 dyads; n (hours) = 11 countries, 1,752 households, 2,030 
persons, 2,584 dyads.  
a Unstandardized coefficients retrieved from separate four-level-models controlling for all individual and family 
characteristics (see Table 3). 
b Expenditure for services, transfers and goods in 100 US-Dollar per capita 2002. 
c 
Percentage of employees in sector N of the International Standard Industrial Classification. 
d Expenditure for 
services, transfers and goods in 1000 US-Dollar per capita 2002. 
e Percentage of countries’ total spending. 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.  
 39 
ANNEX 
Table A1: Sample characteristics help to parent 
  SE  DK  NL  BE  FR  DE 
Dyad G2-G1             
G1 age   82.4  81.5  82.9  81.9  81.8  80.7 
G1 illness: health very good  15.6  17.7  8.0  14.5  7.0  3.8 
   good  19.2  25.8  30.7  32.6  29.9  31.2 
   fair  40.3  32.9  41.2  35.1  36.2  41.9 
   poor  20.3  15.1  16.9  14.0  21.9  16.9 
   very poor   4.6  8.5  3.1  3.8  5.0  6.3 
G1 partner  31.0  35.3  31.5  35.2  40.4  34.7 
Living distance same house  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  1.3  5.6 
   <1km  9.7  9.5  10.7  21.5  8.7  14.7 
   <5km  15.8  17.9  24.8  26.0  14.1  22.3 
   < 25km  21.2  26.6  28.2  34.8  23.8  23.2 
   < 100km  20.9  22.0  18.8  12.3  16.7  15.5 
   < 500km  19.6  19.8  14.3  2.9  16.1  12.0 
   >500km  6.8  0.4  -  -  10.6  2.1 
   >500 km & abroad  5.7  3.4  2.8  2.1  8.7  4.7 
Daughter-mother  41.2  36.3  39.2  38.1  37.3  41.1 
   son-mother  30.2  35.1  32.6  34.2  33.2  32.2 
   daughter-father  16.5  12.9  16.9  14.6  15.4  15.2 
   son-father  12.2  15.7  11.3  13.2  14.1  11.5 
n dyads  955  496  797  1101  1041  764 
Person G2             
Health very good  39.6  30.7  24.6  26.0  23.2  22.3 
   good  34.4  47.2  55.5  53.2  53.7  53.0 
   fair  20.4  16.5  17.0  17.3  17.7  20.6 
   poor  4.6  4.4  2.7  2.9  4.3  3.5 
   very poor  1.0  1.2  0.2  0.6  1.1  0.6 
Education low  37.3  13.3  44.6  38.4  33.4  8.8 
   medium  33.0  47.7  27.3  33.8  38.0  58.9 
   high  29.7  39.1  28.1  27.8  28.6  32.3 
Part / full time employed  72.9  71.7  56.6  50.1  58.0  62.1 
Money from G1  6.0  11.3  2.3  2.6  3.2  4.8 
Gift from G1  37.6  22.6  21.3  29.1  21.4  23.6 
Chance of bequest from G1 <50%  30.6  36.4  50.2  35.6  52.2  58.3 
   >50%  68.0  61.2  47.2  62.6  41.6  41.1 
   unknown  1.4  2.5  2.6  1.8  6.2  0.6 
Number of children (G3)  2.5  2.1  2.2  2.0  2.3  1.7 
Number of siblings   2.0  2.2  3.3  2.4  2.8  1.8 
n persons  785  407  663  896  818  623 
Household             
Household makes ends meet fairly 
/ easily 
82.7  82.2  81.8  72.9  65.4  75.8 
n households  687  360  583  764  702  549 
  AU  CH  ES  IT  GR  Total 
Dyad G2-G1             
G1 age  81.8  83.0  82.9  83.5  82.0  82.1 
G1 illness: health very good  5.3  14.9  7.5  6.6  9.0  10.0 
   good  28.1  33.1  32.7  24.6  34.6  29.2 
   fair  47.0  38.1  38.1  40.4  38.6  38.8 
   poor  17.5  11.6  15.9  20.2  13.8  17.1 
   very poor  2.1  2.3  5.8  8.2  4.1  4.9 
G1 partner  37.8  39.7  34.1  33.5  40.3  35.5 
Living distance same house  6.0  4.6  4.9  10.9  10.2  3.7 
   <1km  15.4  7.0  31.2  28.0  16.8  15.4 
   <5km  20.3  15.9  23.2  18.0  18.3  19.8 
   < 25km  27.0  17.9  16.4  20.4  15.6  23.9 40 
   < 100km  17.1  30.1  10.2  11.0  13.2  16.4 
   < 500km  9.5  11.6  6.4  6.1  20.3  13.0 
   >500km  0.9  8.2  4.7  4.2  3.5  3.8 
   >500 km & abroad  3.9  4.6  3.1  1.4  2.2  4.0 
Daughter-mother  41.5  39.1  40.7  38.7  34.5  38.7 
   son-mother  32.0  28.5  30.1  33.1  35.8  32.8 
   daughter-father  13.4  18.9  16.2  17.2  14.0  15.4 
   son-father  13.1  13.6  13.1  11.0  15.8  13.1 
n dyads  434  302  452  589  894  7,825 
Person G2             
Health very good  23.7  45.1  19.3  13.6  39.4  27.8 
   good  53.2  39.6  50.4  51.9  43.7  48.9 
   fair  18.3  12.8  24.4  29.4  14.0  18.8 
   poor  3.9  2.6  5.6  4.3  2.3  3.7 
   very poor  0.9  -  0.3  0.8  0.7  0.7 
Education low  18.3  39.6  72.1  62.8  40.2  36.7 
   medium  54.7  23.4  13.9  26.3  36.5  36.2 
   high  27.0  37.0  13.9  10.9  23.3  27.0 
Part / full time employed  41.4  69.4  46.9  39.9  56.7  57.2 
Money from G1  3.7  3.8  1.1  1.9  2.7  3.8 
Gift from G1  17.5  38.3  13.9  16.3  19.3  24.1 
Chance of bequest from G1 <50%  75.5  48.5  61.9  72.6  68.0  51.6 
   >50%  24.5  51.1  35.9  25.5  28.6  46.0 
   unknown  -  0.4  2.1  1.9  3.4  2.4 
Number of children (G3)  2.0  2.1  2.4  2.0  1.8  2.1 
Number of siblings   2.0  2.5  2.9  2.3  2.1  2.4 
n persons  355  235  373  486  709  6,350 
Household             
Household makes ends meet fairly 
/ easily 
74.7  82.1  49.1  34.2  32.7  66.4 
n households  328  212  344  442  624  5,595 
Note: SHARE release 2, own calculations, unweighted percentages & means.  
Order of variables according to measurement levels. 
 
Table A2: Sample characteristics help to child 
  SE  DK  NL  BE  FR  DE 
Dyad G2-G3             
G2 help from G3  7.1  11.2  4.6  7.0  5.1  12.0 
G2 money from G3  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.5  2.1 
G3 age   37.3  38.0  36.3  39.1  38.2  38.2 
G3 unemployable   5.0  6.1  2.1  4.0  4.4  3.6 
G3 separated from partner   5.1  6.6  4.2  6.5  5.9  5.7 
Living distance same house  0.4  0.8  0.6  1.2  1.0  8.4 
   <1km  8.7  8.4  13.9  15.3  9.7  11.1 
   <5km  18.0  16.1  29.0  26.8  15.7  18.2 
   < 25km  24.0  27.6  25.0  31.7  24.1  24.3 
   < 100km  19.1  23.0  17.9  17.8  18.3  14.6 
   < 500km  19.6  19.5  11.3  4.4  15.6  15.9 
   >500km  6.6  0.4  -  0.1  11.0  4.1 
   >500 km & abroad  3.6  4.3  2.2  2.8  4.7  3.4 
Mother-daughter  26.8  27.2  27.3  28.3  28.6  27.3 
   mother-son  26.5  27.2  26.5  27.1  27.0  26.8 
   father-daughter  23.2  23.0  23.3  22.8  22.7  23.3 
   father-son  23.5  22.6  22.9  21.8  21.7  22.7 
Number of grandchildren (G4)  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.1 
G3 stepchild   12.6  11.0  3.4  4.3  3.1  4.7 
n dyads  5,497  2,885  4,740  5,700  4,503  4,107 
Person G2             
Health very good  29.0  25.8  19.4  19.2  15.1  9.8 
   good  36.9  44.7  52.5  50.1  49.2  44.7 41 
   fair  25.4  22.3  23.6  24.4  28.2  33.1 
   poor  7.0  4.9  4.1  5.2  6.0  10.3 
   very poor  1.7  2.4  0.4  1.1  1.6  2.1 
Education low  52.2  25.0  57.4  52.1  51.2  18.2 
   medium  27.1  44.8  23.4  25.6  31.0  56.8 
   high  20.7  30.3  19.2  22.3  17.8  24.9 
Part / full time employed  41.1  37.2  27.1  21.0  27.3  26.6 
Number of children (G3)  2.6  2.5  2.6  2.5  2.6  2.2 
n persons  2,413  1,276  2,147  2,736  2,116  2,078 
Household             
Household makes ends meet fairly / 
easily 
79.2  79.0  79.6  69.4  65.6  74.7 
n households  1,719  897  1,418  1,857  1,467  1,389 
  AU  CH  ES  IT  GR  Total 
Dyad G2-G3             
G2 help from G3  10.4  5.3  4.9  5.7  11.6  7.6 
G2 money from G3  2.4  0.7  0.9  1.0  6.3  1.3 
G3 age   38.3  37.9  38.5  38.6  39.7  38.1 
G3 unemployable  6.0  1.9  2.2  1.6  2.8  3.7 
G3 separated from partner   7.0  5.8  3.4  3.2  4.0  5.3 
Living distance same house  10.4  4.0  4.2  10.4  13.7  4.2 
   <1km  12.8  10.9  30.9  21.1  17.5  14.0 
   <5km  19.5  17.7  21.5  22.0  17.2  20.7 
   < 25km  26.7  29.0  17.2  22.0  18.7  24.9 
   < 100km  15.2  20.2  9.9  9.3  7.5  16.1 
   < 500km  10.8  12.8  8.6  4.5  15.9  12.7 
   >500km  1.3  4.3  4.4  7.6  4.5  4.0 
   >500 km & abroad  3.3  1.0  3.3  2.9  5.0  3.4 
Mother-daughter  30.5  27.4  27.6  29,1  30.0  28.1 
   mother-son  27.5  26.0  29.1  27.3  27.8  27.1 
   father-daughter  21.8  23.6  22.5  22.9  21.7  22.8 
   father-son  20.3  23.0  20.8  20.7  20.5  22.0 
Number of grandchildren (G4)  1.2  1.1  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
G3 stepchild   3.3  1.0  0.9  0.7  1.1  4.8 
n dyads  2,703  1,398  2,805  2,751  2,984  40,073 
Person G2             
Health very good  16.3  31.7  7.7  7.2  19.1  17.9 
   good  45.0  47.6  40.7  41.3  38.5  44.9 
   fair  30.4  17.8  36.8  39.6  33.5  28.6 
   poor  7.0  2.7  12.1  10.2  6.9  7.0 
   very poor  1.3  0.2  2.7  1.8  2.0  1.6 
Education low  31.5  55.2  88.0  83.2  72.0  52.3 
   medium  48.4  21.5  6.0  13.0  18.5  29.3 
   high  20.2  23.3  6.0  3.8  9.5  18.4 
Part / full time employed  15.6  33.8  15.8  11.7  19.7  25.4 
Number of children (G3)  2.3  2.5  2.9  2.5  2.3  2.5 
n persons  1,338  656  1,333  1,451  1,604  19,148 
Household             
Household makes ends meet fairly 
/ easily 
74.0  81.2  41.7  35.3  28.7  65.0 
n households  1,002  467  1,015  1,022  1,185  13,438 
Note: SHARE release 2, own calculations, unweighted percentages & means. 
Order of variables according to measurement levels. 42 
Table A3: Macro indicators 
2002  Social expenditure 
(USD/capita) 
Social services 
(% of employees in 






(% of total) 
SE  8,639.5  18.7    986.5  6.0 
DK  8,153.0  18.0  1,167.4  7.0 
NL  6,231.8  14.7    492.3  3.4 
BE  7,666.1  12.1    777.6  5.3 
FR  7,827.9  10.1    827.4  5.6 
DE  7,324.0  10.4    530.7  4.1 
AU  7,725.3  8.6    891.1  5.9 
CH  6,311.2  10.7    465.8  4.0 
ES  4,809.0  5.6    213.6  2.3 
IT  6,545.9  6.1    312.2  2.4 
GR  4,077.6  4.6    231.0  2.4 
Note: OECD (2007a, b, c). 